In this article, we estimate the total earnings losses of male workers with a partial disability, i.e., they are able to work in a different occupation after disability onset. We use a Spanish administrative dataset (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales) from a specific partial disability pension scheme (Incapacidad Permanente Total). Using propensity score estimators combined with difference-in-differences, the estimation of the causal effect of the disability onset shows earnings losses to be approximately €400 per month for the first two years. For male workers over 54, total earnings losses are greater even though they receive greater benefits.
Introduction
There is vast international literature regarding the participation in the labour market of people with disabilities. The literature is mainly focused on the adverse effects of income transfers on the participation of older workers in the labour force. The seminal article in this literature is Parsons (1980) . His study finds that disability pensions may account for the decrease in labour force participation of older men registered in the US. Later, Bound and Burkhauser (1999) review a number of studies and conclude that disincentive effects to work exist and that it is highly likely that Parsons's estimates are overestimated.
However, much less information is available about the effect of disability pensions on subsequent earnings (Charles, 2003; Mok et al., 2008) . With respect to the US case, Stapleton et al. (2009) show that workers' economic well-being declines after disability onset, as the disability pension system does not maintain the disabled household's pre-onset income. The reasons for this are twofold. One, disabled persons have lower labour market participation rates, and two, benefits partially replace lost earnings. A similar conclusion emerges from a German case. In a broader analysis of the effects of health shocks on income, Riphahn (1999) finds that benefits do not fully insulate against the negative consequences of the potential loss in earnings.
The scarce literature on earnings losses does not tackle the specific case of partial disability. By partial disability, we mean that the severity of the disability does not prevent the worker from working, but it usually requires a drastic change in occupation, industry, or both. This article evaluates the causal impact of partial disability on total earnings by assessing the disability earnings gap faced by individuals entitled to a partial disability 3 pension. We use data from a Spanish contributory pension scheme for partially disabled workers 1 . According to the Spanish Social Security, the total permanent disability for usual occupation (henceforth, TPD) is a disability that limits the worker from performing all of the main tasks in their profession, although they may still be able to pursue a different occupation. We focus on this disability benefit because it is fully compatible with performing another job in a different occupation after the onset of the disability. There are other disability pensions, but they almost completely restrict the ability to work.
Accordingly, these other disability pensions are designed for much more severe disabilities 2 . In Spain, over 500,000 people were entitled to a partial disability pension (TPD) in 2013, while over 400,000 people were beneficiaries of other types of disability pensions as their disabilities severely restricted compatibility with work.
The TPD explicitly attempts to compensate the negative welfare impact of the disability onset by providing a pension even though these individuals can perform a job (albeit different from their previous job due to a negative health shock). Our analysis adds to the international literature evaluating whether this partial disability pension closes the earnings gap. To our knowledge, this is a novel study in the international literature, as previous evidence analysing the TPD scheme has strictly focused on the impact of TPD on labour market participation. Benitez-Silva et al. (2010) note that during recession periods, all disability benefits (including TPD) have been used as an excuse for early retirement of lowskilled older workers. Marie and Vall Castello (2012) studied the effects of an increase in the partial disability pension of workers over 54 years of age and obtained a decrease in the 4 likelihood of employment of 8%, which is mainly the result of income effects 3 . Regardless, the impact of the partial disability scheme on total earnings remains unknown.
Our empirical methodology follows the recent literature on the earnings losses of displaced workers. For example, Couch and Placzeck (2010) use propensity score matching techniques to estimate, as usual, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), but in addition, they also apply differences-in-differences (DID) so that unobserved heterogeneity may be controlled. Accordingly, the combination of both types of estimations allows for the control of observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Table A .1). They entered the workforce at age 22, worked for 22.4 years on average and were unemployed for 2.5 years during their former working lives.
Finally, we followed them in 2007, 2008 and 2009 . Therefore, we know whether they returned to work or not, and if they did, we have their contributory bases. As we also have information on the TPD amount, we calculate the total income of those both earning a wage and receiving simultaneously a partial disability pension. Henceforth, we will refer to earnings as the total income (wages and/or TPD pensions). Figure 1 shows the average monthly earnings of TPD workers from 36 months prior to pension entitlement to 24 months after entitlement. Three years before entitlement, the average monthly wage is €1,500. There is a decline in monthly wages as early as 18 to 20 months before pension entitlement, and they decline sharply, by approximately 3 to 6 months before receiving their pension. When the worker obtains the TPD pension, their
earnings are approximately 25% of their wages 2 years prior. These results are quite similar to those shown in Bound et al. (2003) for the US case 7 .
The reasons for the earnings decline before the pension entitlement are likely related to health status, adaptation to disability, long administrative procedures 8 and the effectiveness of medical treatment.
<<Figure 1>>
6 Figure 1 shows that, on average, once workers are entitled to the TPD, their earnings remain stable at a lower level than their pre-decline wages, i.e., approximately €1,000.
Although the majority of participants in the program are older workers, age remains a significant variable for our analysis because it affects the amount of the benefit. As we explain in the Appendix, the size of the pension depends both on the years of work experience and on the age of the beneficiary (notice that there is a threshold of 55 years of age). Obviously, labour trajectory is different for older workers than for younger workers. Figure 2 shows the average monthly earnings of TPD workers by age group. Before entitlement, workers under 50 years of age have the lowest earnings, while those between 55 and 60 have the highest earnings. With respect to earnings after TPD, there are small differences among groups. Presumably, this is the result of two opposite effects. On the one hand, there are differences in wages before the disability onset leading to differences in the pension amounts. Therefore, older workers obtain higher pensions because of the positive correlation of age, labour market experience and wages. On the other hand, the likelihood of re-employment after the onset of the disability is higher for younger workers, increasing total earnings, although they receive a relatively lower pension because of their shorter labour market experience.
<<Figure 2>> 3 Empirical methodology
We aim to estimate the earnings losses due to TPD. Accordingly, we have defined a random sample of male workers aged 30 to 64 years as the control group. This control 7 group does not include persons receiving at any time early retirement pensions or any type of disability pension. As in the treatment group, male workers of the control group are included in the general regime of the Spanish Social Security. Therefore, we are not considering self-employed workers, agricultural workers, domestic workers, seamen, miners or civil servants.
Even though the database contains very detailed information on working lives, there is no direct information on health status, and hence, unobserved heterogeneity may bias our estimations. We have capitalised on the longitudinal nature of the data to combine propensity score matching (PSM) and difference-in-differences estimation techniques. This identification strategy allows us to control for observable and unobservable factors.
According to Smith and Todd (2005) , "a difference-in-differences (DID) matching strategy allows for temporally invariant differences in outcomes between participants and nonparticipants", and therefore, this type of estimator is more robust. On the other hand, PSM relies on a conditional independence assumption (CIA), which means that once the propensity score has been estimated, participation in the program is independent of outcome in the non-participation status. This requires that all variables affecting participation and outcome in the non-participation status be matching (Smith, 2000) .
Considering the outcome of the treated (Y D ) and non-treated people (Y D ), a set of observable variables (X) and the treatment status (d), Rubin (1983, 1984) prove that if
The outcome is similar for treated and non-treated individuals conditional on the X variables or the propensity score P(X).
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The conditional independence assumption (CIA)
means that once the propensity score has been estimated, participation in the program is independent of outcome in the non-participation status (Y C ). If the CIA holds conditional on X, it will also hold conditional on the propensity score,
Under these assumptions, the matching estimator takes the following form (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002) :
where is the weight placed on comparison observation j for individual i and accounts for the reweighting that reconstructs the outcome distribution for the treated sample.
The CIA is very difficult to assess, particularly in this case, as the data about health status are non-existent. Heckman et al. (1998) propose a combination of matching and differencein-differences that allows us to control for selection from observed and unobserved variables. Using longitudinal data, we can estimate the effect of the treatment in the following way (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002) :
in the estimation must be balanced between treated and control individuals 9 . The explanatory variables included in the propensity score estimation are age, age at the beginning of the first employment spell, skill level, years of working experience until the TPD, number of unemployment spells before the TPD, work experience in the industrial sector, employment 18 months prior to TPD, and region of residence. Table A .2 in the Appendix shows the results for the probit estimation of the propensity score. All of the estimates that satisfy the balancing property are obtained through nearest neighbour matching 10 . In addition, as we have exclusively used observations in the common support, only observations in the control group with the same range of propensity score in the treatment group are included in the estimations 11 .
As previously explained, the CIA is very difficult to assess because direct information on health status is not included in our dataset. Nevertheless, as we have longitudinal data, we can overcome this shortcoming by combining matching (i.e., estimations of average effect of the treatment on the treated) and difference-in-differences with the 24th month before entitlement and then controlling by unobserved heterogeneity, for example, health status.
Our assumption is that earnings trends would be the same in both groups in the absence of treatment. This treatment (the permanent disability) induces a deviation from the common trend that is captured by the difference-in-differences approach (Couch and Placzek, 2010) .
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4 Empirical results and discussion Table 1 shows the results of applying difference-in-differences on the average effect of the treatment on the treated. The estimated impact is negative, showing a permanent decrease in earnings with respect to two years before being entitled to the TPD (t 0 ), a period in which the disability has yet not had any effect on earnings, as explained in the descriptive analysis.
The size of the earnings losses is considerable and remains relatively stable over time.
Earnings losses are approximately €450 per month for the first year after the TPD entitlement; there is then a small decrease at the beginning of the second year, and by the end of the second year after entitlement, losses are below €400.
<<Table 1>>
As explained in the Appendix, for workers over 54 years of age, the disability pension increases from 55% to 75% of the regulatory basis, which is closely tied to previous wages.
Therefore, we also estimated the total earnings losses of male workers under and over the age threshold (see Table 1 ). For the first 6 months after the TPD entitlement, earnings losses are quite similar for both age groups, with a decrease in earnings of approximately €450 monthly. In the second year after the TPD entitlement, earnings losses for workers over 54 increase by up to €500 per month, while the losses for workers below 55 remain stable or even decrease slightly. As a consequence, there is a widening earnings gap for older workers, especially among the oldest, whose losses are 20% higher than for those 11 who are under 55. At the end of second year after the TPD entitlement, there is a slight increase in earnings losses for workers over 54 and a significant decrease in earnings losses for those under 55; the earnings losses are €407 and €308, respectively. Therefore, the earnings gap between both groups widens over time, mainly because earnings losses of workers under 55 decrease by as much as €300 per month.
Accordingly, there is a significant permanent earnings loss, on average, after the TPD entitlement. Presumably, these earnings losses are linked to three facts: the increasing trend in wages of the control group, the flat shape over time of the TPD pension (defined as a percentage of past wages) and the re-employment behaviour after receiving a TPD pension.
The first, the increasing trend in wages for the control group, suggests the relevance of the break in one's working career that is usually linked to a new disability (i.e., a negative health shock). Those not suffering such a negative health shock do not incur any loss of specific human capital, and on average, they follow an improving trend as they increase their work experience. This is not the case for people entitled to a TDP pension, however.
Even when obtaining a job after entitlement, it is presumed that previous work experience will not be useful as the individual typically must change occupations.
The second fact, the flat shape over time of the TPD pension, indicates that earnings from the TPD pension remain stable. The amount of the pension is strictly linked with past wages (see Appendix for details) and does not increase over time (unless the individual attains the age of 55 and is still without employment).
The third fact, re-employment behaviour after receiving a TPD pension, is related to the reemployment probability of those entitled to a TPD pension. At a descriptive level, Malo et al. (2011) finds that, as of 2006, the rate of TPD workers who are employed is approximately 15.6%, and Vall Castello (2012) finds that the likelihood of employment for workers with a disability is 11.6% in 2007 (using a slightly different calculation methodology). Therefore, the beneficiaries of a TDP pension exhibit a relatively low employment rate. Is this caused by the amount of the TDP pension? Marie and Vall Castelló (2012) use the increase in the amount of the TDP pension at 55 years of age as a natural experiment to estimate the causal impact of this increase on the probability of employment. Their results show that this change decreases employment probability of beneficiaries by 8%. Similarly, Malo et al. (2011) have shown that in Spain, the likelihood of returning to work for those receiving a TPD pension decreases as age increases.
The estimated earnings losses are large enough to assume that they will have a negative impact on the welfare of TPD beneficiaries. What are the policy options to close the earnings gap?
The first fact suggests that it is important to implement an intervention at the same time, or just after, one becomes eligible to receive the TPD pension, as this would facilitate reemployment. Rehabilitation programmes and specific counselling regarding labour market integration for these workers would also be highly beneficial. Although these interventions do exist in Spain, the current earnings gap indicates that they are not sufficient as they have not alleviated the problem.
The second and third facts call for an increase in the amount of the TPD pension to close the earnings gap, especially for workers over 54 years of age. However, the income effects of such an increase, as found by other authors, emphasise the negative incentives to return to work. Therefore, policy interventions, such as specific rehabilitation programmes and specialised labour market intermediation, seem to be a preferable option. Furthermore, these policies should be especially intense and adapted for older workers above 54 because a worker close to retirement age finds it increasingly more difficult to return to work and 13 "the payoff for doing so is fairly minor. In most cases, the effort will yield only a few years of earnings and is not likely to make a major change in retirement income" (Yčas, 1996: 173).
Our analysis of the two age groups (see Table 1 ) is coherent with the above recommendations. Because workers over 54 years of age have seniority and receive higher wages, their benefits are also generally higher. Moreover, their benefits are calculated as 75% of the regulated base rather than the 55% that workers under 55 years of age receive.
Despite these favourable conditions, earnings losses are clearly greater for older workers.
On the other hand, while younger workers have a lower pension, they also experience a lower level of permanent earnings losses. For this group, specific policy interventions may also be essential, but the incentives still favour participation in the labour market as they have a longer horizon ahead to obtain wages and higher retirement pensions in the future.
Thus, the most realistic option for closing the current permanent earnings gap is to facilitate re-employment after the TPD entitlement. Active measures seem to be the best candidates to accomplish this challenge.
Finally, as a robustness check, we estimated the same model using annual data from the salary payments rather than the contributory base. These data also come from the MCVL, which includes tax data from the National Revenue Agency. The advantage of this fiscal information is the inclusion of total personal earnings (with no minimum or maximum thresholds, as in the case of contributory bases). However, the weakness is that because we have only annual data, we lose the monthly evolution of contributory bases. there is an earnings gap between the control and the treatment group that increases after the TPD entitlement.
The estimations with DiD-PSM are consistent with the above findings. There is a decrease in annual earnings of 3,000 euro during the first year after accessing the TPD pension, and this increases to 4,800 euro two years later and 4,300 euro three years later. Separately estimating the effect for workers over 54 and under 55 years of age, we again find that the decrease in total earnings is higher for older workers.
Therefore, the annual information confirms the results obtained using monthly data.
<<Figure 3>>
Conclusions
Disability pensions are income transfers programmes that attempt to alleviate the earnings decrease related to the difficulties of finding a suitable job after the onset of a disability.
The majority of the previous literature has focused on the negative impact of these types of programmes on the incentive to return to work.
However, evaluating the main objective of such programmes, that is, whether they close the total earnings gap or not, remains unexplored. Thus, this has been the objective of this research. We have focused on a specific type of disability pension (TPD or total permanent disability, in Spanish, Incapacidad Permanente Total) of the Spanish Social Security. The TPD is for workers who have become partially disabled, but can still work, although the work would be in an occupation different from their pre-disability work. In other words, this type of disability pension is fully compatible with working.
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We have used an administrative dataset that provides longitudinal information on wages and pensions as well as the full employment history of all individuals. We have defined a treatment and a control group. The treatment group consists of male workers entering the TPD pension in 2005 or 2006, while the control group corresponds to fully comparable male workers. The econometric strategy combines propensity score matching and difference-in-differences. The PSM estimates the impact of the programme conditioned on observable variables, while the DiD controls for unobserved heterogeneity, such as the health status of individuals, which is not directly observable in our dataset.
The descriptive analysis shows a decline of earnings even 18 months before the TPD pension entitlement and a sharp decrease approximately 6 months before the entitlement.
On average, while there is a partial recovery of this decrease, a significant earnings gap remains up to two years following entitlement. The estimation of the causal effect of the TPD shows a significant earnings gap for male workers entitled to the TPD. This gap is approximately 400 euro per month two years after pension entitlement. When estimating separately for workers under and over 54 years of age, earnings losses for the oldest subgroup are greater, even though they receive greater benefits.
Therefore, the main objective of this policy is only partially satisfied. The TPD partially closes the earnings gap with respect to those not suffering this type of negative health shock. However, a significant earnings differential remains in the long-term.
The policy options to close this earnings gap and improve the well-being of these workers include increasing the amount of the TPD pension and developing additional interventions that are aligned with active labour market policies.
Previous empirical literature shows that increasing the amount of the TPD pension has a negative impact on employment probabilities, especially for those male workers above 54 years of age. Active policies, such as rehabilitation programmes and specialised labour market counselling, may increase the re-employment probabilities of these workers without introducing negative incentives to work. However, more intense and/or adapted programmes should be implemented for workers over 54 years of age, as they not only suffer a larger earnings gap even after receiving higher benefits, but they also face more challenges to return to work after becoming disabled.
On the other hand, if young workers with partial disability return to employment, they have the opportunity to increase their wages over their expected longer working life and thereby contribute to larger retirement pension. The higher employment rates of disabled workers under 55 years of age suggest that they may maintain their earnings (i.e., economic wellbeing) at a similar level as before the negative health shock.
The OECD (2007) advises that people with a partially reduced work capacity should not leave the labour force permanently and that they should be supported as they seek to find an appropriate job or to remain in their current job so their social inclusion and living standards may be raised. Our results support that Social Security should both maintain income support to workers with a partial disability and should encourage their employment participation (for example, with specialised active labour market policies) to prevent the permanent deterioration of their economic well-being, even more so for older workers.
There are three levels of contributory pensions for permanent disability in Spain: total permanent disability for usual occupation, absolute permanent disability and serious disability 12 .
A serious disability is the most severe form of disability. It is permanent, and the individual requires assistance from another person to perform daily activities, such as getting dressed, moving, eating, and so on.
An absolute permanent disability is a disability that absolutely limits the worker from performing the basic duties of any profession or trade.
A total permanent disability for usual occupation (TPD) is a disability that limits the worker from performing the main tasks of his profession, although the individual is capable of performing the tasks associated with a different profession. We focussed on the latter because no other disability is compatible with performing a different job at either the same or a different workplace 13 .
The eligibility requirements for a total permanent disability pension in Spain are as follows 14 :
-The applicant must be either under 65 years of age at the time of the causal event or the disability must be the result of an ordinary disease or a non-work related injury and 12 Here, we follow the translation into English of the Spanish legal terms included in the web page of the Spanish Social Security: http://www.segsocial.es/Internet_6/Trabajadores/PrestacionesPension10935/Incapacidadpermanen10960/RegimenGeneral/Gr ados/index.htm 13 The other two pensions do not prevent profit or non-profit activities being carried out. However, these activities should be in accordance to the legally recognised level of disability and not related with a change in the capacity to work. Otherwise, the claimant could be reassessed and downgraded to the total permanent disability category. 14 We refer to the General Social Security System. The other systems are specific schemes for self-employed workers, agricultural workers and seamen. be unable to meet the admission requirements of the contributory retirement pension -i.e., 15 years of contributions.
-The applicant must be affiliated with the Social Security System or be associated with a similar legal program.
If the disability event is due to a work-related injury or an occupational illness, there are no requirements with respect to previous contributions. In other cases (i.e., ordinary diseases of life), a minimum contributory period applies depending on the age of the applicant.
In Spain, the Social Security administration is responsible for assessing, qualifying and reviewing eligibility for contributory benefits related to permanent disability 15 .
The amount of the TPD benefit is calculated as 55% of the regulatory base (RB) with regard to the cause of the disability. This percentage may increase to 75% for beneficiaries over 55 years of age when they are unlikely to find employment in a different activity due to a lack of overall or specialised training and as a result of the economic and employment situations in the area of residence.
The calculation of the regulatory base varies depending on the cause of the permanent disability as follows: 
